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Abstract
The rejection of unfair offers can be affected by both negative emotions (e.g. anger and moral disgust) and deliberate
cognitive processing of behavioral consequences (e.g. concerns of maintaining social fairness and protecting personal
reputation). However, whether negative emotions are sufficient to motivate this behavior is still controversial. With modified
ultimatum games, a recent study (Yamagishi T, et al. (2009) Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 106:11520–11523) found that people
reject unfair offers even when this behavior increases inequity, and even when they could not communicate to the
proposers. Yamagishi suggested that rejection of unfair offers could occurr without people’s concerning of maintaining
social fairness, and could be driven by negative emotions. However, as anonymity was not sufficiently guaranteed in
Yamagishi’s study, the rejection rates in their experiments may have been influenced by people’s concerns of protecting
personal reputation (reputational concerns) in addition to negative emotions; thus, it was unclear whether the rejection was
driven by negative emotions, or by reputational concerns, or both. In the present study, with specific methods to ensure
anonymity, the effect of reputational concerns was successfully ruled out. We found that in a private situation in which
rejection could not be driven by reputational concerns, the rejection rates of unfair offers were significantly larger than zero,
and in public situations in which rejection rates could be influenced by both negative emotions and reputational concerns,
rejection rates were significantly higher than that in the private situation. These results, together with Yamagishi’s findings,
provided more complete evidence suggesting (a) that the rejection of unfair offers can be driven by negative emotions and
(b) that deliberate cognitive processing of the consequences of the behavior can increase the rejection rate, which may
benefit social cooperation.
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Introduction
The rejection of unfair offers is crucial in maintaining social
fairness and cooperation [1,2]. Ultimatum game (UG) was often
employed to characterize people’s attitude toward unfair offers [3].
In UG, one participant (the responder) has to decide to either
accept or reject an offer of money made by another player (the
proposer) whose task is to distribute a sum of money between two
of them. If the offer is accepted, both receive the money,
otherwise, no one receives anything. It has been found that the
responder often rejects unfair offers even though he/she does not
know who the proposer is and the game is played only once [2,4].
Rejection of unfair offers in UG can be regarded as a kind of
altruism which is important for the evolution of reciprocity and
social cooperation [5].
Recently, it has been suggested that in the UG, (a) negative
emotions play an important role in the responder’s rejection
behaviors [4,6,7] and (b) deliberate cognitive processing of the
consequences of the rejection behavior, such as concerns of
maintaining social fairness and protecting personal reputation, also
significantly influence responders’ decisions [8,9,10,11]. There-
fore, an interesting and important question arises. Is the cognitive
processing of behavioral consequences necessary for rejection or
are negative emotions sufficient to drive rejection behaviors? This
question, however, is still controversial [12,13].
A recent related behavioral study provided some evidence to
address this question [14]. Yamagishi and his colleagues used two
modified versions of the UG, ‘‘impunity game’’ (IG) and ‘‘private
impunity game’’ (PIG). In both games, the proposer will receive
the money regardless of the responder’s choice, whereas the
responder can only receive the money by accepting the proposal.
In IG, the proposer will be informed of the responder’s choice,
while in PIG, the proposer will not be. In Yamagishi’s study,
substantial rejection rates (i.e., significant .0) were found in IG
and PIG, which demonstrated that responders reject unfair offers
even when this behavior increases inequity. As the rejection of
unfair offers that increases inequity cannot be explained by the
responder’s deliberate cognitive processing of their behavioral
consequences, such as concerns of maintaining social fairness,
Yamagishi interpreted their findings by the model of emotion as
a commitment device, which proposed that: negative emotional
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people to reject unfair offers.
For the different settings in IG and PIG, Yamagishi proposed
that, in IG, responders may imagine the proposers’ feelings of
knowing the responders’ choices. Thus, the responders could
conclude that the rejection behaviors, as a ‘‘symbolic punishment
to the unfair proposer’’, may be helpful in maintaining social
fairness [14]. In other words, in contrast to PIG, the decision of
rejection rates in IG may also be influenced by the responders’
deliberate cognitive processing of their behavioral consequences in
addition to negative emotions. However, in their study, the
rejection rates were not significantly different between IG and
PIG, indicating that (by Yamagishi’s reasoning), in IG, the
concerns of the consequences of the rejection behavior may not
significantly influence the rejection rates. Therefore, Yamagishi
suggested that the emotion ‘‘as a commitment device seem strong
enough to dictate that one’s behavior be consistent regardless of
the consequences of the behavior’’. In other words, Yamagishi
suggested that the rejection of unfair offers could be dominated by
negative emotions in their situations.
However, we found that, in Yamagishi’s study, responders’
anonymity was not sufficiently guaranteed, i.e., when the
responders were making decisions, they may have perceived that
their individual choices were known by the experimenters
1.I n
social decision-making tasks, it has been found that the presence of
an audience, even if it is only the experimenter, can cause
significant changes in participants’ behaviors [15], and this effect
can be explained as the participant’s concerns of protecting
personal reputation (reputational concerns) during the task
[16,17]. Therefore, the experiment setting Yamagishi used may
have led to rejections in both games being influenced by the
responders’ reputational concerns in addition to negative emo-
tions. People might reject unfair offers during IG and PIG based
on the consideration of protecting personal reputation besides the
negative emotions. Therefore, it is still unclear whether people’s
rejection of unfair offers can be driven by negative emotions.
In our current study, using specific setting in which no one
could know responders individual decisions, responders’ anonym-
ity was ensured in our private situation, thus, in this situation, the
effect of reputational concerns would be ruled out. Consequently,
if responders rejected unfair offers in the private situation, they
could be driven by negative emotions. We hypothesized that the
rejection rates in the private situation would be lower than those in
public situations. More importantly, by comparing the rejection
rates in the private situation with zero, we may demonstrate
whether the rejection was only based on the reputational concerns,
thus find further evidence to address the question: can the
rejection of unfair offers be driven by negative emotions?
In our study, we renamed the two games as ‘‘informed impunity
game’’ (informed-IG, for Yamagishi’s IG) and ‘‘non-informed
impunity game’’ (non-informed-IG, for PIG). We examined
responders’ rejection rates in these two games when they made
choices with anonymity or been observed by an experimenter.
Participants’ rejection in the non-informed-IG in anonymous
condition can be regarded as taking place in a private situation in
which no one (including the experimenter) would know a partic-
ipant’s individual decision, while other situations can be regarded
as public situations.
Note 1. In Yamagishi’s study, in the ‘‘strategy method’’ and
‘‘one-shot method’’ settings, each participant received an envelope
from an experimenter, which contained the decision sheets. The
participant then made a decision individually and sealed it into the
envelope without being seen by anyone else. After that, the
participant gave the envelope to an experimenter and waited, and
later on, the same experimenter would return the envelope back to
the participant (sealed, possibly containing money, according to
the decision made by the participant). Although participants were
told that they would never directly interact with the experimenters
who knew their individual choices, they could have felt that their
choices were known by the experimenter who had taken and
returned their envelopes. In the ‘‘repeated one-shot method,’’
participants’ choices were recorded individually with computers,
thus participants may also have felt that the experimenters knew
their individual choices. In other words, since it was possible for
experimenters to know participants’ individual choices in Yama-
gishi’s study, it cannot be ruled out the possibility that participants
sensed that their decisions were made in public situations. In our
present study, specific settings in the private situation eliminated
the possibility for anyone to be aware of each participant’s
individual choice (see Materials and Methods). Consequently,
participants could feel assured that their decisions were not known
by anyone (including the experimenters).
Materials and Methods
Ethics Statement
The study and the consent procedure were approved by the
Human Research Ethics Committee of the University of Science &
Technology of China (USTC) according to the principles
expressed in the Declaration of Helsinkioral.
As the key of this study was to obtain participants’ rejection
rates on unfair offers under truly private situation, anonymity must
be guaranteed in our study. Therefore, beside our specific
experiment settings, to further ensure participants’ sense of
anonymity, we obtained oral consents of participants without
requiring them to give their personal identification, which made
them feel less identifiable. In a previous study with anonymity,
researchers also did not obtain information about participant’s
personal identification for ensuring anonymity (Kurzban R, et. al.
(2007) Evolution and Human Behavior 28: 75–84).
In our study, the oral consent was obtained in following
procedure. After complete description of the study to the
participants, participants who did not want to continue were
allowed to leave, so that participant’s stay in the classroom was
regarded as his/her consent of involvement in the study. This
procedure was supervised by at least three experimenters and
documented (written) by an experimenter.
Regarding the participants aged 16/17 - these young students
were of comparable intelligence and ability to adult students in the
USTC, and able to take charge of their behaviors including taking
part in some simple behavior studies. According to the law in
China: ‘‘A minor aged 10 or over shall be a person with limited
capacity for civil conduct and may engage in civil activities
appropriate to his age and intellect; in other civil activities, he shall
be represented by his agent ad litem or participate with the
consent of his agent ad litem’’, from the ‘‘General Principles of the
Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China’’, Article 12 in
Chapter II. Therefore, we got the consents from the participants’
selves rather than from their legal guardians (usually their parents)
for the involvement of our current simple behavior study.
Participants
Four hundred and twenty seven students (329 males and 98
females, aged 16 to 29) at the University of Science & Technology
of China, Hefei, Anhui, China, participated in our experiment. All
played the role of responder. We employed a two-by-two design,
including two games, ‘‘informed impunity game’’ (informed-IG)
and the ‘‘non-informed impunity game,’’ (non-informed-IG) in
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Both the game and condition factors were manipulated as
between-participants factors. Each participant performed one
game in one condition with two paradigms: a behavioral paradigm
and a questionnaire paradigm.
Experiment Settings and Procedure
In the present study, we adapted the settings that had been used
by previous studies on other tasks [15,18] with specific methods to
guarantee anonymity. Our data were obtained in several testing
sessions (see Text S1 for detailed information about each testing
session). In each session, we first recruited 11 to 76 participants
and required them to stay in a classroom. One experimenter then
introduced the requirements of the experiment. For ensuring
participants’ sense of anonymity, we obtained oral consents of
participants in following procedure. After complete description of
the study to the participants, participants who did not want to
continue were allowed to leave, so that participant’s stay in the
classroom was regarded as his/her consent of involvement in the
study. This procedure was supervised by at least three experi-
menters and documented (written) by an experimenter. The study
and the consent procedure were approved by the Human
Research Ethics Committee of the University of Science &
Technology of China.
One at a time, each participant then went to the front of the
classroom and took an envelope from a box that contained about
200 envelopes of different types according to our task design. Each
envelope contained (a) the rules, which were printed on a sheet of
paper, and explained whether the participant was playing the
informed IG or the non-informed IG; (b) the ‘‘real’’ proposal by
a ‘‘proposer’’: a number-stamp printed on the paper represented
the money a proposer offered; no actual proposers were involved
in any of our experiments, but participant (who played the role of
responders) was told that he/she would receive a proposal from
a ‘‘real’’ proposer who had ‘‘participated’’ an earlier session of our
experiments and been required to ‘‘give’’ a proposal in the games;
(c) the money offered to the responder according to the proposal;
and (d) a decision sheet with all nine possible proposals from 9:1
(proposer receives 9 Chinese Yuan, and responder receives 1
Chinese Yuan) to 1:9 (proposer receives 1 Chinese Yuan, and
responder receives 9 Chinese Yuan). Please see Text S2 for details
about the envelopes and our experiment settings.
After taking the envelope, each participant, also one at a time,
went into a separate cubicle beside the classroom to make
a decision. In the sessions of experimenter condition, there was
one experimenter in the cubicle who observed each participant’s
decision-making behavior. The participant was not allowed to
communicate with the experimenter. In the sessions of anonymous
condition, there was no one in the cubicle. Two games were
carried out in a given condition in each session. In the cubicle, (a)
in the behavioral paradigm, the participant made a decision upon
the ‘‘real’’ proposal according to the rules (informed IG or non-
informed IG), if the participant accepted the proposal, he/she
would take the money; otherwise, he/she would leave the money
in the envelope; (b) in the questionnaire paradigm, the participant
decided whether to accept or reject each of the nine possible
proposals (ranging from 9:1 to 1:9) by marking (printing with
a stamp) their decision on the corresponding place on the sheet.
Participants did not get money when responding to the
questionnaire paradigm, and their actual outcomes were de-
termined only by whether they accepted or rejected the proposal
(took the money or left it in the envelope).
Thereafter, the participant sealed the envelope, went back into
the classroom, and dropped the envelope into a ballot box (a box
with a narrow split on the top). The participant could then leave or
go back to his/her seat in the classroom. Only after one
participant finished all steps above could the next participant
start the task. Participants who stayed in the class room were not
allowed to communicate. With this procedure, in the non-
informed IG under anonymous condition, no one (including the
experimenter and the proposer) could know a given participant’s
individual decision; therefore, each participant could trust that the
decision-making was truly private. As we reasoned in the part of
Introduction, responders’ rejection of unfair offers in the non-
informed IG under anonymous condition could not be attributed
to the responders’ deliberate cognitive processing of the conse-
quence of their rejection behavior, e.g. reputational concerns, but
could be driven by negative emotions.
According to the condition in each session and the envelope
type taken by each participant, all 427 participants were assigned
to the anonymous condition (n=92 for informed-IG and 92 for
non-informed-IG) or the experimenter condition (n=127 for
informed-IG and 116 for non-informed-IG). They all completed
the decision sheet in the questionnaire paradigm. To elicit
responders’ decision on unfair offers in the questionnaire
paradigm, about 85% of the envelopes contained ‘‘real’’ proposals
of 8:2 (proposer received 8 Chinese Yuan, and responder received
2 Chinese Yuan. The decisions on 8:2 proposals were also used as
participants’ decisions on unfair offers in Yamagishi’s study (800,
200 Japanese Yen) [14]). To enhance the sense of reality, some
envelopes in the box contained other proposals (7:3, 6:4, and 5:5;
about 5% each). As some participants took ‘‘real’’ proposals other
than 8:2, decisions on 8:2 ‘‘real’’ proposals were obtained from
355 participants, including the anonymous condition (n=78 in
informed-IG and n=83 in non-informed-IG), and the experi-
menter condition (98 in informed-IG and 96 in non-informed-IG).
The results from these 355 participants were regarded as the
responders’ decisions toward unfair offers in the behavioral
paradigm.
Results
In the behavioral paradigm, participants were led to believe that
they were facing a single offer that had actually been proposed by
a ‘‘real’’ proposer and that they should choose whether to accept
or reject it. Participants’ decisions on 8:2 proposals (proposer
received 8 Chinese Yuan, and responder received 2 Chinese Yuan)
were obtained as their decisions on unfair offers in each game in
each condition.
As shown in Figure 1, in the experimenter condition, the
rejection rate for the 8:2 offer in the informed-IG (59.2%) was not
significantly different from that of the non-informed-IG (58.3%, x
2
(1) =0.014 p=1.000, ns.). However, in the anonymous condition,
the rejection rate in the informed-IG (52.6%) was significantly
higher than that in the non-informed-IG (31.3%, x
2 (1) =7.465
p=0.007), and the rejection rate in the non-informed-IG was
significantly larger than zero (x
2 (1) =30.829 p,0.001).
The rejection rate in the non-informed-IG in the anonymous
condition was also significantly lower than those in informed-IG
and non-informed-IG in the experimenter condition (x
2 (1)
=14.023 p,0.001, and x
2 (1) =13.080 p,0.001), and the
rejection rate in the informed-IG in the anonymous condition
was not significantly different from those in the informed-IG and
non-informed-IG in the experimenter condition (p.0.4, ns.).
In the questionnaire paradigm, participants were asked to
imagine they were facing a range of offers, and they had to decide
whether to accept or reject each of the nine possible offers. The
results, which were summarized in Table 1, replicated the findings
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participants in the non-informed-IG in the anonymous condition
(35.9% and 35.9%, rejection rates for 8:2 and 7:3, respectively)
showed significantly lower rejection rates than those in the
informed IG in the anonymous condition (63.0% and 56.5%),
informed IG (66.1% and 57.5%) and non-informed IG (61.2%
and 53.4%) in the experimenter condition, and the rejection rates
toward these unfair offers in the non-informed-IG in the
anonymous condition were significantly larger than zero. Please
see Text S3 for detailed results of rejection rates in questionnaire
paradigm.
Discussion
We obtained people’s rejection rates of unfair offers in
informed-IG and non-informed-IG in experimenter and anony-
mous conditions. Results were consistent across behavioral and
questionnaire paradigms. In the experimenter condition, respon-
ders’ rejection rates were not significantly different between
informed-IG and non-informed-IG, which is similar to the pattern
in Yamagishi’s results. In the anonymous condition, however, the
rejection rate in non-informed-IG was significantly larger than
zero and lower than that in informed-IG.
According to our hypothesis, we isolated the effects of
reputational concerns and negative emotions on rejection of
Figure 1. Rejection rates of unfair offers (8:2) in the behavioral paradigm. It is clear that the rejection rates in the three public situations
(informed-IG and non-informed-IG in the experimenter condition and the informed-IG in the anonymous condition) were significantly larger than the
rejection rate in the private situation (non-informed-IG in the anonymous condition), and there was a substantial rejection rate in the private
situation. Numbers on top of the bars (e.g., 58/98) represent the numbers of participants who rejected the offers (e.g., 58) and the total numbers of
participants in that game in the condition (e.g., 98). *** Significantly differed at p,0.001 level, and ** at p,0.01 level in x
2 tests.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0039619.g001
Table 1. Rejection rates in questionnaire paradigm.
Offers in Rejection rates (%)
Chinese Yuan Experimenter condition Anonymous condition
Proposer
got
Responder
got
Informed IG
N=127 *
Non-informed IG
116
Informed IG
92
Non-informed IG
92
9 1 78.0 80.2 75.0 62.0
8 2 66.1 61.2 63.0 35.9 **
7 3 57.5 53.4 56.5 35.9 **
6 4 33.9 31.0 27.2 16.3
5 5 11.0 18.1 9.8 7.6
4 6 22.8 21.6 17.4 17.4
3 7 29.9 34.5 27.2 22.8
2 8 34.6 37.1 27.2 23.9
1 9 32.3 43.1 31.5 26.1
*Total numbers of participants in the corresponding game and condition.
**For those offers, participants’ rejection rates in the non-informed IG in anonymous condition were (a) significantly lower than those in informed IG in the anonymous
condition, and the informed IG and non-informed IG in the experimenter condition (p#0.012, in x
2 tests) and (b) significantly larger than zero (p,0.001, in x
2 tests). See
Supporting Text S3 for details.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0039619.t001
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condition, since responders believed that no one would know their
individual choices, their rejection could not be attributed to the
concerns of protecting personal reputation, but was driven by
negative emotions. The substantial rejection rate in this situation,
together with Yamagishi’s findings, provided more complete
behavioral evidence suggesting that rejection of unfair offers can
be driven by negative emotions.
Biological Basis of Negative Emotions on Rejection of
Unfair Offers
Some recent studies have explored the biological basis of social
decision-making [1,2,4,6,19,20,21,22,23,24,25]. To our knowl-
edge, no neural imaging study with true anonymous settings
directly investigates the neural correlates of the rejection of unfair
offers that is driven by negative emotions2. However, some studies
found that in response to unfair offers, people usually exhibit
negative emotions such as anger and outrage and show
concomitant physiological and neural responses [26]. For exam-
ple, people confronted with unfair behaviors showed increased
activity in the anterior insula, a brain area associated with negative
emotions, and the strength of the activation was positively
correlated with rejection rates [2,4]. These findings suggested that
the desire to alleviate unpleasant feelings evoked by unfair acts
may be one of the primary motivations for the rejection of unfair
offers [2]. Therefore, from a biological perspective, it could be
suggested that rejection of unfair offers could be driven by negative
emotions, and that brain activation and physiological responses
related to affect are part of underlying biological processes.
Effects of Cognition on Rejection
In the present study, responders’ rejection rates in public
situations (informed-IG in the anonymous condition, and in-
formed-IG and non-informed-IG in the experimenter condition)
were significantly larger than rejection rates in the private situation
(non-informed-IG in the anonymous condition). This increase may
be due to the effect of responders’ cognitive processing of their
behavioral consequences. Cognitive functions that specifically deal
with the social environment can acquire and process information
from the environment. Thus, a small change in the environment
could make a big difference in behavior [10]. For example, people
rejected more unfair offers from human proposers than those
randomly provided by a computer [27,28], suggesting a top-down
cognitive influence on the processing of unfair offers. In the public
situations in our present study, responders could utilize cognitive
abilities to understand that their decisions would be known by
others and conclude that rejection has positive consequences, such
as protecting personal reputation, thus reject unfair offers. As
a result, in public situations, the rejection rates were significantly
increased.
Functions of Emotion and Cognition
It has been suggested that when people make social decisions in
a rich and interactive environment, both affective factors (such as
negative emotions) and cognition are functioning [2,6]. Together
with Yamgishi’s and our present findings, it could be inferred that
pro-social or altruistic behaviors, such as maintaining fairness and
cooperation, could be driven by affective factors without deliberate
reasoning of the behavioral consequence. This raises the possibility
that people could exhibit these behaviors with limited cognitive
resources, which can be seen as a type of protection of these
behaviors that guards the stability of social decision-making. This
notion is in line with Yamagishi’s suggestion that emotion can be
‘‘as a commitment device’’ to ensure the consistence of people’s
behavior on unfair offers [11]. On the other hand, cognitive
functions that allow people to fully understand and evaluate the
consequences of their behavior may lead to changes in decisions,
e.g., by motivating people to be less selfish and more strategic with
consideration of social factors such as reciprocity and equity [10].
Therefore, it can be suggested that cognition ensures the efficiency
of social decision-making behaviors in complicated and flexible
situations.
In conclusion, we found that people’s rejection rates of unfair
offers were significantly larger than zero in a private situation,
which provided further evidence suggesting that rejection of unfair
offers can be driven by negative emotions. The higher rejection
rates in public situations suggested that deliberate cognitive
processing of the consequences of the behavior, such as
reputational concerns, could increase the rejection rate, which
may benefit social cooperation.
Limitations and Future Work
Behavioral, brain imaging and neuropsychological studies in
future are needed to further clarify the behavioral characteristics,
biological basis, and individual differences in rejection of unfair
offers, so as to explore the nature of the behaviors in social
decision-making under given situations. Especially, to assure
anonymity, the present study did not obtain any debriefing data
(such as survey evidence) to quantitatively test whether participants
indeed experienced negative emotions when they were confronted
with unfair offers. Future studies with more sophisticated design
which can get participants’ emotion reactions under anonymity
are asking for. Moreover, people usually exhibit more altruism
behaviors as the ‘‘social distance’’ decrease [29,30], which may be
one of the possible interpretations for the larger rejection rates in
our pubic situations. However, as there is generally only a rather
limited range for perceived social distance in economics experi-
ments maintaining anonymity among the participants [30], it was
not easy to clarify the effect of social distance on rejection rates
based on our current results, which is an important question
needed to study in the future.
Note 2. In a recent review [6], researchers mentioned that
‘‘Both anonymous and nonanonymous versions of the above
games (including UG) have been studied with neuroimaging’’
(page 26). The term ‘‘anonymous’’ used in that review was specific
to the anonymity between partners in the games, rather than each
participant’s anonymity as in our present study.
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